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COMMENT 

ATTORNEY DIRECT MAIL COMMUNICATION: THE 

KOFFLER COMMERCIAL SPEECH 

APPROACH 

I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 1976 two attorneys in Phoenix, Arizona decided 
that advertising was a critical element for the economic survival of 
their law office.' The office was dedicated to providing routine legal 
services at moderate fees for middle income persons who did not 
qualify for government legal services.2 The attorneys placed an ad­
vertisement in a daily newspaper of general circulation.3 Their ad­
vertisement offered legal services at reasonable rates and listed the 
services available with accompanying fees.4 The attorneys' use of 
newspaper advertising was a clear violation of the Arizona rules of 
.professional conduct.s Citing these rules, the state bar association 
filed a disciplinary complaint against the attorneys.6 The case 
reached the United States Supreme Court as Bates v. State Bar of 
Arizono.7 The Court recognized attorney advertising as a form of 
constitutionally protected commercial speech8 and held that a state 
cannot proscribe attorney newspaper advertising that is truthful and 
concerns the terms and availability of routine legal services.9 
1. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 354 (1977). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 355. As part of its regulation of the professional conduct of the Arizona 
bar, the Arizona Supreme Court imposed and enforced a disciplinary rule restricting 
advertising by attorneys: Id. at 353. 
6. Id. at 356. 
7. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
8. Id. at 380-82. 
9. Id. at 384. For an in-depth analysis of the Court's rationale, see Case Develop­
ments, Constitutional Law-Commercial Speech Afforded First Amendment Protection-Fee 
Advertising by Members of the Legal Profession: Bates v. State Bar, 21 How. L.J. 903 
(1978); Comment, Lawyer Advertising: The Practical Effects ofBates, I W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 349 (1978); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 70, 198-208 (1977). 
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Bates was the first in a line of four Supreme Court cases in the 
general area of unsolicited attorney communication for the purpose 
of generating business. Two, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association 10 
and In re Primus, II dealt with solicitation,12 an area of attorney com­
munication with prospective clients that is closely related to advertis­
ing. 13 The fourth, In re R.MJ. ,14 dealt with the specific question of 
"whether certain aspects of the revised ethical rules of the Supreme 
Court of Missouri regulating lawyer advertising conform to the re­
quirements of Bates." 15 R.MJ. also provided some generalizations 
on commercial speech doctrine in the context of professional services 
10. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). An attorney solicited automobile accident victims in per­
son for the purpose of representing them in claims against the insurance company under 
the uninsured motorist clause in one victim's automobile insurance policy. Id at 449-52. 
The Court held that the state or the state bar association, acting with state authorization, 
constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person for pecuniary gain 
under circumstances that pose dangers of attorney overreaching, overcharging, under­
representation, or misrepresentation, all of which the state has a right to prevent. Id at 
449,462. 
II. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). An attorney who worked without compensation for a 
nonprofit legal organization used direct mail solicitation to contact potential plaintiffs for 
a civil action involving the involuntary sterilization of welfare mothers. Id at 416. The 
Court held that the state constitutionally may regulate, but may not proscribe, solicita­
tion by an attorney whose primary purpose is other than pecuniary gain. Id at 439. For 
an indepth analysis of the background and rationales of Ohralik and Primus, see Chris­
tensen, Advertising by Lawyers, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 619; Pulaski, In-Person Solicitation 
and the First Amendment: Was Ohralik Wrongly Decided?, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.I. 23; Com­
ment, Attorney Solicitation: The Scope ofState Regulation After Primus and Ohralik, 12 
U. MICH. I.L. REF. 144 (1978); Note, Solicitation By Attorneys: A Prediction and a Rec­
ommendation, 16 HOUSTON L. REV. 452 (1979); Note, Commercial Speech and the Limit 
ofLegal Advertising, 58 OR. L. REV. 193 (1979); Note, Lawyer Solicitation: The Effect of 
Ohralik and Primus, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 960 (1979); Note, Benign Solicitation o/C1i­
ents by Attorneys, 54 WASH. L. REV. 671 (1979). 
12. Solicitation is defined as a movement to action-an endeavor to obtain by ask­
ing-and implies personal petition to a particular individual to do a particular thing. In 
re Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 146,412 N.E.2d 927, 931,432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981); see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1248-49 (5th ed. 1979) 
[hereinafter cited as BLACK'S). 
13. Advertising is defined as a calling to the public attention by any means whatso­
ever. BLACK'S, supra note 12, at 50. These means can include print and broadcast me­
dia, billboards, or direct mail. Examination of the two definitions reveals a semantic 
difference between solicitation and advertising. This difference will be referred to as the 
"solicitation-advertising dichotomy." This distinction, however, is not without paradox. 
The two activities overlap. All advertising, either directly or indirectly, involves solicita­
tion. In re Koffler, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 146,412 N.E.2d 927, 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981). This overlap is illustrative of the fallacy in 
using the term "advertising-solicitation dichotomy" as an analytical tool in judicial 
analysis. 
14. 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982). 
15. Id at 932 .. 
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advertising. 16 None of these decisions, however, provides a concise 
analytical approach for dealing with situations which arguably can 
be categorized as both solicitation and advertising. The most strik­
ing example of such a situation l7 is attorney direct mail communica­
tion with prospective clients for pecuniary gain. IS The absence of a 
Supreme Court decision providing specific guidelinesl9 in the area20 
16. Id. at 937. R.M.J. outlined three policy generalizations regarding proscriptive 
regulation of professional services advertising. First, states may impose appropriate re­
strictions on advertising that is inherently misleading or subject to abuse. Second, re­
strictions on professional services advertising may be no broader than is reasonably 
necessary to prevent deception. Finally, the state may regulate, through narrowly drawn 
restrictions, only to the extent that the restriction furthers the state's asserted substantial 
interest in regulation. Id. at 937-38. 
17. Another example is attorney direct mail communication with real estate bro­
kers who seek closing referrals. See notes 90-91 infra and accompanying text. 
18. Direct mail is defined as printed matter designed to solicit trade through the 
mails. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 641 (1976). In the case of 
attorney direct mail communication, printed matter would provide information on legal 
services and fees. The problem with att\!mpting to dispose cleanly of attorney direct mail 
communication with prospective clients for pecuniary gain under any case in the Bales 
line is twofold. First, there is the semantic problem of whether the communication is 
advertising or solicitation. See note 13 supra. Second, even if it were possible to achieve 
an acceptable classification, the cases are not clearly dispositive. If one classifies attorney 
direct mail communication with prospective clients for pecuniary gain as advertising, one 
finds that the Bales holding, restricted to ''whether the state may prevent the publication 
in a newspaper of ... [a] truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of 
routine legal services," 433 U.S. at 384, is not clearly applicable. Rather, an argument by 
analogy is necessary to bring attorney direct mail communication within Boies. On the 
other hand, classification as solicitation finds the Primus holding, addressed to solicita­
tion not for pecuniary gain, 436 U.S. at 439, clearly inapplicable. The Ohralik holding, 
prohibiting solicitation for pecuniary gain that involves potential for overreaching, 
overcharging, and undue influence, 436 U.S. at 449, may be applicable only if the possi­
bility of those dangers is demonstrable. Such a demonstration is extremely difficult to 
generate in a prospective manner. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 
934 (Ky. 1978). 
19. R.M.J. inferred that the absolute prohibition of attorney mailing of announce­
ments to an audience of other than lawyers, friends and relatives, and present and former 
clients only could be supported by a demonstration of the state's inability to supervise 
such mailings or in the absence of a less restrictive alternative. 102 S. Ct. at 939. R.M.J. 
also proposed filing of general mailing copy with the bar association as a possible means 
of supervision, id. , and labelling of general mailing envelopes "This is an Advertisement" 
as a less restrictive alternative. Id. at n.20. R.M.J., however, clearly restricted its analy­
sis to the facts of the particular case. Id. at 939. 
20. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in two cases involving attorney direct 
mail communication with prospective clients for pecuniary gain. Eaton v. Supreme 
Court, 270 Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), em. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981); In re Kof­
fier, 51 N.Y.2d 140,412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), eerl. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 
(1981). As a writ of certiorari is discretionary, denial does not include any indication of 
the Court's view on the merits of a case that it declined to review. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-5 at 35 n.8 (1978). A third case, In re R.M.J., 102 S. Ct. 929 
(1982) dealt with im attorney's alleged violation of the Missouri advertising rules. Id. at 
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has thrust resolution of this issue upon the states.21 
This comment will highlight the recent New York Court of Ap­
peals decision, In re KoJ!Ier,22 against the background of attorney 
advertising and solicitation. KoJ!Ier held that the state may regulate, 
but may not constitutionally proscribe, attorney direct mail commu­
nication with prospective clients for pecuniary gain.23 The signifi­
932. See notes 14-17, 19 supra. One of the questions presented on appeal involved the 
state's discipline of an attorney for mailing announcements of an office opening to per­
sons with whom he was not yet acquainted. Id at 939. At least one commentator felt 
that the disposition of the RM.f appeal would resolve the direct mail issue. Note, High 
Court to Rule on Lawyer Ad Controls, 67 A.B.A. J. 1108, 1108 (1981). 
21. In the wake of Bates, many states and the District of Columbia have amended 
their attorney advertising rules. See Andrews & Brosnahan, Regulation oj'Lawyer Adver­
tising: In the Public Interest?, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 423, 426 n.19 (1980) for a partial 
listing of those jurisdictions that have amended their advertising rules. There is no clear 
majority position on the use of direct mail as a method of attorney communication with 
prospective clients. Maine specifically includes direct mail as a permissible means of 
"public communication" available for attorney use. ME. BAR R. 3.9(a). Massachusetts, 
on the other hand, explicitly proscribes attorney direct mail communication with pro­
spective clients. MASS. DR 2-103. Other jurisdictions have adopted less clear positions. 
The actions of the state courts in the areas of attorney advertising, solicitation, and direct 
mail after Bates have shown no clear trend. In re Carroll, 124 Ariz. 80, 602 P.2d 461, 466 
(1979) (radio advertisement offering victims of a train explosion free transportation to an 
attorney's office for consultation not prohibited in light of the absence of advertising 
standards after Bates); Eaton v. Supreme Court, 270 Ark. 573, 580, 607 S.W.2d 55, 59 
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981) (advertising that lists a $10 consultation fee and a 
series of questions on need for legal services in broad areas without distinguishing fees 
for various legal services and distributed through discount coupon mailing is potentially 
deceptive and insufficient to provide information to facilitate an informed selection of a 
lawyer and therefore properly subject to proscription); In re Amendments to the Code of 
Professional Responsibility and Canons of Judicial Ethics, 267 Ark. 1181, 1185, 590 
S.W.2d 2, 4-5 (1979) (plan disapproved which proposed allowing attorney advertising of 
specialization after state certification); The Florida Bar re Amendment to the Florida Bar 
Code of Professional Responsibility, 380 So.2d 435, 438 (Fla. 1980) (Florida adopts the 
American Bar Association model rules on advertising); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 
568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978) (direct mail advertising by attorneys is constitutionally 
protected unless the state or the state bar association can justify a prohibition by demon­
strating a state interest which outweighs individual and societal interests in commercial 
speech); Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So.2d 489, 496 (La. 1978) (letters to 
employee groups concerning prepaid legal plans constitute direct solicitation which state 
may prohibit in its regulation of the practice of law); Woll v. Kelley, 409 Mich. 500, 510­
13,549-51,297 N.W.2d 578, 581-82, 600 (1980) (charges dismissed against attorneys who 
invited, by letter, retired union members to meetings on the pursuit of workmen's com­
pensation claims on the grounds that the antisolicitation statute was inapplicable to attor­
ney truthful advertising); In re Petition for Rule of Court, 564 S.W.2d 638, 643-44 (Tenn. 
1978) (attorney advertising approved except for use of handbills, circulars, billboards, or 
any other means, not including established and regularly circulated or broadcast media). 
22. 51 N.Y.2d 140,412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
1026 (1981). 
23. Id. at 143, 412 N.E.2d at 929, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 873. 
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cance of KoJIIer24 lies in the court's rationale, which provided a 
detailed, analytical approach25 blending prior Supreme Court deci­
sions with current New York Court of Appeals logic. This analytical 
approach can resolve those cases in the area of attorney communica­
tion with prospective clients that fall beyond the scope of the Bates 
line. In order to fully comprehend the importance ofKoJIIer, prelim­
inary discussion of several background topics is necessary: The atti­
tude of the practicing bar toward attorney advertising, and the 
constitutional history of commercial speech, attorney advertising 
and solicitation. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Attitude of the Practicing Bar Toward Advertising 
Despite the Bates approval of attorney advertising and the 
states' acceptance of attorney advertising .in their rules of court,26 the 
practicing bar has exhibited an indifferent attitude toward advertis­
ing.27 There are two reasons cited for this indifferent attitude. First, 
attorneys have maintained a traditional and ingrained reluctance to 
advertise because they perceive the practice of advertising as being 
beneath the standards and dignity of the profession.28 The Baies 
Court refuted the reasoning behind the traditional reluctance to ad­
vertise;29 yet recent surveys indicate that the practicing bar does not 
24. The decision resolved the conflict in New York State on the use of attorney 
direct mail communication. In March 1979, the New York Bar Association's Committee 
on Professional Ethics ruled that attorneys could advertise by direct mail. Andrews & 
Brosnahan, supra note 21, at 431 n.52. The lower court in KqJler reached a contrary 
decision in October, 1979. In re Koffler, 70 A.D.2d 252, 272, 420 N.Y.S.2d 560, 573 
(1979), rev'd, 51 N.Y.2d 140,412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. denied,450 
U.S. 1026 (1981). 
25. See notes 133-46 supra and accompanying text. 
26. See note 21 supra. 
27. A pre-Bates survey indicated that 69% of the attorneys surveyed were against 
the advertising of attorney fees while 46% were against attorney use of electronic media 
advertising. Victor, Commentary on Legal Advertising, 66 WOMEN LAW. I. 6, 9 (1980). 
One post-Bates survey indicated that only 3% of the attorneys surveyed had ever adver­
tised. 89% of those same attorneys indicated that they never would advertise. Id at 6 
(emphasis added). Another post-Bates survey indicated that only 49.7% of those attor­
neys surveyed favored some sort of advertising. Meyers & Smith, Attorney Advertising, 
Bates and a Beginning, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 470 (1978). Furthermore, a significantly 
smaller group, only 26.4%, felt direct mail should be allowed. Id at 474. For a more 
expansive discussion of attorney attitudes toward advertising, see Muris & McChesney, 
Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services: The Case for Legal Clinics, 
A.B.F. RES. I. 179, 181-82 (1979); Meyers & Smith, supra, at 431-32; Walker, Advertising 
By Lawyers: Some Pros and Cons, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1979). 
28. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 212 (1953). 
29. 433 U.S. at 368-82. The Court discussed each of the following rationales for 
402 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:397 
accept the Bates refutation.3D Second, the practicing bar has not 
viewed advertising as a cost effective means of attorney communica­
tion with prospective clients. 31 Available statistics, however, do not 
lend support to this view of cost effectiveness.32 
The noted statistics demonstrate that direct mail communica­
tion is the most cost effective means of generating legal business.33 
The statistics also indicate that direct mail may be the answer to the 
practicing bar's concern with the cost effectiveness of advertising.34 
Despite the possibility of direct mail communication as a solution to 
the cost effectiveness problem, neither the Supreme Court decisions3s 
nor the divergent amendments to state attorney advertising rules36 
give significant guidance to state courts with respect to analytical ap­
proaches for determining the constitutionality of legislative proscrip­
tion against attorney direct mail communication with prospective 
proscription of attorney advertising and found each one singularly unpersuasive: Ad­
verse effect on professionalism; inherently misleading nature of attorney advertising; ad­
verse effect on the administration of justice; undesirable economic effects of advertising; 
adverse effect of advertising on the quality of service; and difficulties of enforcement of 
advertising standards. Id 
30. See note 27 supra. 
31. One commentator has argued that the perception of inadequate cost effective­
ness has been fueled by the wide-spread publicity given law firms that have experienced 
financial difficulty as a result of large advertising expenditures. Victor, supra note 27, at 
7. The most striking example of financial difficulty is the bankruptcy of a Massachusetts 
firm which had relied on advertising to attract clients and had launched an unsuccessful 
$200,000 advertising campaign. Id 
32. These statistics are drawn from two sources. First, a 1980 marketing survey 
found that the most cost effective permissible form of attorney advertising surveyed was 
the yellow pages of the telephone book. Winter, Lawyer Ads Yield $8 Per Every Dol/ar 
Spent: Survey, 66 A.B.A. J. 705 (1980). On the average, every dollar spent on any form 
of advertising generated eight dollars in legal fees; the minimum return was two dollars 
in fees for every dollar spent on advertising. The survey did not include direct mail 
communications. Id 
Second, the law firm involved in KoJ!ler, Komer & Harrison of Islip, New York, 
experienced a twenty-five dollar return in legal fees for every one dollar spent in a direct 
mail campaign. The firm expended $3,750 during a direct mail campaign, lasting slightly 
over eight months, which generated $100,000 in real estate closing fees over the next 
several years. Telephone interview with Alfred S. Komer, Komer & Harrison (Mar. 12, 
1981) (updating the figures Attorney Komer had quoted during disciplinary proceedings. 
See notes 89-91 infra and accompanying text). 
33. At the present time the cited statistics are the only ones available. Although it 
is possible that the statistics may be biased in some manner, it is worth noting that re­
searchers have not reported any statistics to the contrary. 
34. State legislatures and judiciary have not yet established a clear trend on the 
status of attorney direct mail communication with prospective clients for pecuniary gain. 
See note 21 supra. 
35. See note 18 supra. 
36. See note 21 supra. 
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clients for pecuniary gain.37 In order to understand fully the consti­
tutional ramifications of a proscription of attorney direct mail com­
munication, it is necessary to briefly survey the constitutional history 
of commercial speech and attorney advertising. 
B. 	 Constitutional History of Commercial Speech and Attorney 

Advertising 

The Supreme Court recently has defined commercial speech as 
"an expression related solely to the economic interest of the speaker 
and its audience."38 Originally commercial speech was not entitled 
to first amendment protection under Valentine v. Chrestensen.39 In 
Valentine, petitioner owned a submarine that he exhibited for profit 
and advertised through the distribution of handbills. The Supreme 
Court denied petitioner's request to have a New York City Police 
Commissioner enjoined on constitutional grounds from enforcing a 
city ordinance prohibiting handbill distribution.40 The Court held 
that commercial advertising is not entitled to first amendment pro­
tection because the Constitution imposes no restraint on the govern­
ment with regard to the regulation of commercial advertising.41 
The Court subsequently eroded the Valentine doctrine in a line 
of decisions beginning with Cammarano v. United States.42 Justice 
Douglas penned a concurring opinion, characterizing Valentine as 
"casual, almost oflhand . . . [i]t has not survived reflection."43 
In Ginzburg v. United States ,44 the Court further eroded the doc­
trine by stating that "commercial activity, in itself, is no justification 
for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First 
Amendment."45 The erosion continued in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.46 The Pittsburgh Press 
Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting newspapers from advertising 
37. 	 See id 
38. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Servo Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980). 
39. 	 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
40. 	 Id at 53-54. 
41. 	 Id at 54. 
42. 358 U.S. 498 (1959). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
265-66 (1964); Wolfe V. City of Albany, Georgia, 189 F. Supp. 217, 221 (M.D. Ga. 1960). 
43. 	 358 U.S. at 513-14. 
44. 	 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
45. 	 Id at ~74. 
46. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). Pittsburgh Press was a 5-4 decision in which the majority 
relied on Valentine. Id. at 376-77, 384-88. The erosion of Valentine surfaced in the 
strong dissents of Chief Justice Burger, and of Justices Stewart and Blackmun. Each 
dissent strongly criticized Valentine. 
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employment opportunities in sex-designated columns, but suggested 
that speech could not be denied first amendment protection merely 
because it concerned commercial matters.47 In dicta, the Court 
stated that even an "ordinary commercial proposal" might merit first 
amendment protection if its informational value outweighed the 
government regulatory interest.48 The case for abandonment of the 
Valentine doctrine was given additional support two years after Pitts­
burgh Press, later in Bigelow v. Virginia .49 
The Bigelow Court, holding that a state statute prohibiting the 
advertisement of abortions violated the first amendment, balanced 
state interests with first amendment interests. so The Court consid­
ered both the advertiser's rights and the right of the general public to 
obtain information.51 Bigelow held that any advertisement convey­
ing "information of potential interest and value" to the public 
should be entitled to first amendment protection. 52 
In 1976, the Supreme Court extended first amendment protec­
tion to product advertising in Virginia State Board 0/Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council. 53 The Virginia Pharmacy Court 
held that the state could not constitutionally proscribe advertising 
that was truthful and concerned lawful activity. 54 The question of 
attorney advertising was resolved by Bates. 
In Bates, decided one year after Virginia Pharmacy, the Court 
held that the state may not constitutionally proscribe attorney news­
paper advertising that is truthful and concerns the terms and availa­
47. Id. at 389. The crux of the decision was the illegal nature of the content of the 
advertisements, furthering sex discrimination in employment. Id. at 388-89. 
48. Id. at 389. 
49. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
50. Id. at 826-27. 
51. Id. at 828-29. 
52. Id. at 822. 
53. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
54. Id. at 773. The rationale underlying Virginia Pharmacy rested upon a combi­
nation of three notions. First was the premise, from the first amendment, that regulation 
of an activity is impermissible on the ground that ignorance is preferable to knowledge. 
Second, was the idea that the values of free speech under the first amendment are not 
limited to political dialogue but, rather, extend to any exchange of ideas or information 
that will generate a more knowledgeable basis for individual choice of alternatives. Fi­
nally, commercial information is indispensable not only for the proper allocation of re­
sources in a free enterprise system, but also for the formation of intelligent opinions on 
how to regulate or alter that system. L. TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-15, at 654-55. A key 
section of Virginia Pharmacy was the Court's proposal of a three-part test for the consti­
tutionality of restrictions on the manner of professional advertising. See notes 124-28 
infra and accompanying text. The Court, however, reserved opinion on the permissibil­
ity of the regulation of other professional advertising, including that of attorneys. 425 
U.S. at 773 n.25. 
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bility of routine legal services.55 Several questions remained open as 
a result of the narrow holding in Bates.56 From a constitutional per­
spective, the most important of these questions was the appropriate 
standard of review for regulation of advertising.57 
Friedman v. Rogers,58 involving a challenge to the Texas statute 
prohibiting optometry practice under a trade name,59 exemplified 
the Court's developing willingness to afford first amendment protec­
tion to commercial speech. The afforded protection, however, was of 
a lesser degree than that given to political speech and associational 
freedoms.60 Without articulating a standard of review, the Court 
emphasized that some forms of commercial speech regulation are 
constitutionally permissible. Examples noted by the Court included 
regulation of time, place, and manner of dissemination and false, 
deceptive, and misleading content.61 
In 1980, the Court resolved the standard of review problem in 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission .62 
In Central Hudson, a utility company, on first amendment grounds, 
contested a statute that purported to advance energy conservation by 
barring advertising to promote the use of electricity.63 The Central 
Hudson Court used a level of scrutiny64 that required a substantial 
government interest, directly advanced by the regulation, for the reg­
ulation to pass first amendment muster.65 
The standard of review previously associated with first amend­
ment cases was strict scrutiny.66 Under a strict scrutiny level of re­
55. 433 u.s. at 383. 
56. See notes 1-9 supra and accompanying text. 
57. Canby, Commercial Speech of Lawyers: The Court's Unsteady Course, 46 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 401, 403 (1980). 
58. 440 U.S. I (1979). 
59. Id. at 3. 
60. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). 
61. 440 U.S. at 9. 
62. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
63. Id. at 559. 
64. This standard appears to be analogous to the Court's equal protection interme­
diate scrutiny standard. The intermediate equal protection standard was developed dur­
ing the 1971 term, Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward· In Search of 
Evolving f)octrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. 
L. REV. I, 17 (1972), and is a method of judicial intervention into legislation without 
strict scrutiny. Id. at 18. The old system was two-tiered: Scrutiny was either strict in 
theory and fatal in fact, or minimal in theory and permissive in fact. Id. at 8. The 
intermediate standard allows the courts to "assure rationality of means, without unduly 
impinging on legislative prerogatives regarding ends." Id. at 23. 
65. 447 U.S. at 566. 
66. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 64 (1976) (significant encroachments on the first 
amendment must be justified by a government interest that "survives exacting scrutiny"); 
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view, a regulation restricting first amendment rights must further a 
"compelling state interest"67 to be constitutionally valid. The Cen­
tral Hudson promulgation of an intermediate standard for commer­
cial speech cases resulted in first amendment protection that is 
quantitatively less than that accorded to political speech and associ a­
tional freedoms under a strict scrutiny standard.68 
In summary, constitutional progress in the area of commercial 
speech and advertising has been substantial but remains open for 
development. The focus of this development will be the application 
of intermediate scrutiny to a variety of commercial speech cases. 
For example, the Court has not yet ruled specifically on attorney 
direct mail communication with prospective clients.69 The incom­
plete progress in commercial speech is further exemplified by the 
constitutional history in the area of solicitation. 
C. Constitutional History ofSolicitation 
The prohibition of attorney solicitation originated in the early 
days of the English bar, when young men who studied law predomi­
nately were from the wealthy class and looked upon the practice of 
law in the same light as a seat in Parliament: a form of public serv­
ice for which compensation was merely incidental.7° Solicitation 
generally was proscribed on the basis that it was undignified, unpro­
fessional, and fraught with such perils as commercialization, en­
genderment of litigation, possibility of undue influence, and 
overreaching.71 
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with attorney solici­
tation in a line of decisions, beginning with NAA CP v. Button 72 and 
ending with Ohralik. The first segment of this line of cases deals 
with group solicitation; the second deals with individual solicitation. 
Button held a state statute prohibiting solicitation unconstitu­
tional on the ground that the statute unduly inhibited freedom of 
speech and association. The NAACP, whose activities are not di­
rected to the protection of pecuniary rights or liabilities, was the ob-
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 680 (1972) (official actions with adverse impact on first 
amendment rights must be justified by a "compelling" or "paramount" state interest). 
67. L. TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-8, at 602. 
68. See notes 64-67 supra. 
69. See notes 10-21 supra. 
70. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210 (1953). 
71. Id. at 212. 
72. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
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ject of the application of the statute.73 Button was the first of the 
group solicitation cases.74 In the most recent, United Transportation 
Union v. State Bar of Michigan ,75 the Court noted that a common 
theme connected all of the cases: "[C]ollective activity, [including 
solicitation], undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is 
afundamental right within the protection of the first amendment."76 
The collective activity theme clearly expresses the constitutional pro­
tection afforded an attorney's participation in group solicitation. 
The constitutional status of individual attorney solicitation, however, 
remains unclear. This constitutional status forms a rough spectrum, 
one extreme affording complete protection 77 and the other extreme 
completely proscribing activity.78 
The Court established the two extremes of the individual solici­
tation spectrum on the same day.79 In Ohralik, an attorney had 
solicited several automobile accident victims for the purpose of rep­
resenting them in personal injury claims against the uninsured mo­
73. /d. at 437. 
74. The other major group solicitation cases are UMW, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State 
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 225 (1967) (in view of first amendment rights, a union cannot be 
prohibited from employing an attorney on salary to pursue workmen's compensation 
claims) and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Virginia State Bar, 377 
U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (union members have first amendment right to receive a recommenda­
tion from union legal department on selection of an attorney to pursue workmen's com­
pensation claims, and those attorneys who accept work under the plan are exercising 
constitutional rights which the state may not abridge). 
75. 401 U.S. 576 (1971). The state bar association had brought an action to enjoin 
the union from undertaking activities designed to protect union members from excessive 
legal fees at the hands of incompetent attorneys including recommendation of attorneys 
and pursuit of a 25% limit on contingent fees to those attorneys engaged. Id. at 577. 
76. Id. at 585 (emphasis added). 
77. Wholly protected activity includes attorney solicitation that is for the purpose 
of engaging in litigation as a form of political expression and association and undertaken 
without motive for pecuniary gain. An example of this kind of activity is the solicitation 
of welfare mothers to engage in litigation seeking to enjoin pursuit of a repugnant state 
policy. Under this policy, pregnant mothers on public assistance were being sterilized or 
threatened with sterilization as a condition for the continued receipt of medical assistance 
under the Medicaid program. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 416 (1978); notes 82-83 
infra and accompanying text. An attorney, in cases of this kind, has an ethical obligation 
to see that legal aid is available. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 470 
(1978) (Marshall, J.; concurring). 
78. Proscribed activity includes fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, and 
other solicitation activity which represents assertion of fraudulent claims, invasion of 
privacy, and vexatious pecuniary self-interest which negates an attorney's unbiased judg­
ment on a client's behalf. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 461-62. An 
example of this kind of activity is "[C)lassic. . . 'ambulance chasing,' fraught with obvi­
ous potential for misrepresentation and overreaching." Id at 469 (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
79. Id at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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torist clause found in the automobile insurance policy of one 
victim.80 The Court held that the state may constitutionally disci­
pline a lawyer for soliciting clients: In person; for pecuniary gain; 
and under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the state has an 
obligation to prevent.81 Primus represented the other extreme within 
the individual solicitation area. In Primus, ail attorney who worked 
for a nonprofit organization, without compensation, used direct mail 
to contact potential plaintiffs for a civil action involving damages 
and an injunction against the involuntary sterilization of welfare 
mothers.82 The Court held that the state may regulate but not pro­
scribe solicitation by an attorney when his primary purpose is not 
pecuniary gain.83 
Combining attorney advertising and solicitation into the general 
category of commercial speech raises two problems in constitutional 
analysis of state regulation of the activities. These problems are best 
illustrated by reference to the Bales line. First, from a factual stand­
point, neither Ohraltk nor Primus satisfactorily resolved those cases 
in which there is not only attorney pecuniary motive but also an ab­
sence of fraud, overreaching, misrepresentation, or the possibility of 
any vexatious conduct. Direct mailing communication to prospec­
tive clients for the purpose of gaining legal employment, and direct 
mailing to real estate brokers in order to generate referrals for clos­
ings, provide two factual examples of circumstances not directly dis­
posed of by Primus or Ohralik. Second, from a doctrinal standpoint, 
the standard of constitutional review under Ohraltk84 and Primus85 
is strict scrutiny. Bales, however, did not articulate a standard of 
80. Id at 449-52. 
81. Id at 449. The "dangers that the State has a right to prevent," id, are specifi­
cally identified as "those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, in­
timidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious [attorney] conduct.''' Id at 462 
(quoting Brief for Appellant at 25). 
82. 436 U.S. at 416 n.6. 
83. Id at 439. See sources cited notes 10-11 supra. 
84. The Court noted that appellant Ohralik had conceded a "compelling" state 
interest in the regulation of attorney conduct. By agreeing with Ohralik, the Court 
adopted a standard of strict scrutiny. 436 U.S. at 462. 
85. The Court characterized Attorney Primus' actions as participation in "'collec­
tive activity undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts ... [as] a fundamental 
right within the protection of the First Amendment.''' 436 U.S. at 426 (quoting United 
Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401U.S. 576,585 (1971». The Court also noted that the 
litigation undertaken by Attorney Primus was "'a form of political expression'" and 
"'political association'" and indicated that any suggestion of lowered constitutional 
scrutiny was inappropriate and impermissible. Id at 428 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 429, 431 (1963». 
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review.86 Thus the courts are in a quandary and must determine 
whether they should apply strict scrutiny under Ohralik or Primus, 
or intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson. 
The present state of the constitutional law in this area87 demon­
strates the need for an analytical approach that is capable of dealing 
with the problems inherent in the Bates line. The New York Court 
of Appeals, in KofIler, proposed such an analytical approach. 
II. KOFFLER 
A. Facts 
In August 1977, Attorney William H. Harrison placed an adver­
tisement in Newsday, a Long Island, New York daily newspaper of 
large circulation. The advertisement posted a fee of $235 for resi­
dential real estate closings and provided the attorney's telephone 
number.88 The response to the advertisement was negligible.89 It 
was obvious that the advertising needed a different approach. On 
August 24, 1977, Attorney Harrison and his partner, Attorney Alfred 
S. Koffler, began a direct mail campaign aimed at local homeowners 
and real estate brokers.90 The broker letter produced a minimal re­
86. See note 57 supra and accompanying text. 
87. See notes 62-67 supra and accompanying text. 
88. In re Komer, 70 A.D.2d at 254, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 562. 
89. 51 N.Y.2d at 143,412 N.E.2d at 929, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 874. 
90. 70 A.D.2d at 254, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 562. 
The letter to the homeowners was headed by a reproduced copy of the advertise­
ment. It then stated: 
"Dear Homeonwer [sic]: 
"The advertisement shown above is being run by our office in 'Newsday's' 
real estate section. 
"We understand that you are selling your home and we would like to take 
this opportunity to inform you that because we are now allowed to advertise 
our services YOU no longer need to pay $400.00 to $600.00 for legal representa­
tion when you close title. 
"IN FACT, BECAUSE WE ARE ABLE TO CONTACT YOU BY DIRECT MAIL, WE 
ARE WILLING TO TRANSACT AND REPRESENT YOU AT THE SALE OF YOUR PROP­
ERTY FOR $195 00 
"Feel free to contact us if you have any questions. 
"If you wish, you may make an appointment with us prior to selling your 
house. This will enable us to draw your contracts quickly when you and a 
purchaser come to terms. 
"Enclosed you will tind our business card. We look forward to represent­
ing you." 
The letter to the real estate brokers was also headed by a reproduced copy 
of the advertisement and stated: "Dear Broker: 
"The advertisement shown above is being run by our office in 'Newsday.' 
"We think you will agree that the fee of $235.00 is very competitive, NEV­
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sponse and was discontinued.91 The homeowner letter, however, 
was highly successful and generated fees in excess of $100,000.92 On 
April 7, 1978, the New York Joint Bar Association Grievance Com­
mittee initiated disciplinary proceedings against the two attorneys. 
The complaint alleged that the attorneys had engaged in illegal and 
unethical practices and professional misconduct.93 
The attorneys responded with a three-pronged defense. First, 
they argued that DR 2-103(A)94 and the statute were unconstitu­
tional restrictions of permissible commercial speech. Second, the at­
torneys stated that their actions had been in good faith reliance on 
Bates. Finally, they argued that the letters were in full compliance 
with the advertising guidelines adopted by the New York State Bar 
Association and the New York Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ERTHELESS, WE ARE NOW HAPPY TO ADVISE THAT OUR FEE TO ALL BROKER­
REFERRED CLIENTS WILL BE $195.00, REGARDLESS OF THE PURCHASE PRICE OF 
THE PROPERTY. 
"Weare proud that we are able to decrease the cost of this aspect of home­
ownership at a time when Long Islanders are finding it increasingly expensive 
and difficult in many ways to own their own home. 
"Enclosed are two of our business cards. Our principal office is at 670 
Main Street, Islip, New York, however, we also have facilities at 61 Randall 
Road, Shoreham. We can be contacted in Islip at 581-6000 during normal busi­
ness hours or in Shoreham at 744-4444 after 9:00 P.M. and on weekends. 
"We look forward to assisting you by assisting your clients." 
Id. at 254-55, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 562. 
91. See note 31 supra. 
92. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. 
93. The complaint specifically alleged" 'illegal and unethical practices and profes­
sional misconduct' ..." in violation of the New York Code of Professional Responsibil­
ity and the New York anti-solicitation statute. 70 A.D.2d at 256, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 563 
(quoting Joint Bar Association Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District no­
tice of petition dated April 7, 1978). The appropriate section of the New York Code of 
Professional Responsibility in force at the time ofthe Koffler mail out reads: "'A lawyer 
shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or 
associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a 
lawyer.''' 51 N.Y.2d at 145,412 N.E.2d at 930, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875 (quoting New York 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1975». Although this section 
was amended in 1979 to comply with Bales, the amendment has the same scope when 
applied to the issue of direct mail communication and thus has no bearing on the present 
discussion. Id. at 145 n.3, 412 N.E.2d at 930-31 n.3, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875 n.3. Section 479 
of the New York Judiciary Law reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person or his agent, employee or any person 
acting on his behalf, to solicit or procure through solicitation either directly or 
indirectly legal business, or to solicit or procure through solicitation a retainer, 
written or oral, or any agreement authorizing an attorney to perform or render 
legal services, or to make it a business so to solicit or procure such business, 
retainers or agreements. 
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 479 (McKinney 1968). 
94. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1975). 
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ment.95 The appellate division referred the case to a retired court of 
appeals judge for a referee's hearing.96 
The referee found that the attorneys' actions in direct mail com­
munication with prospective clients violated both the statute and DR 
2-103(A). The violation was not found on the basis of their use of 
direct mail communication but, rather, because the content of the 
direct mail communication constituted solicitation, not advertising.97 
The appellate division affirmed the referee's findings and held that 
direct mail communication with prospective clients for pecuniary 
gain was beyond the bounds of permissible commercial speech and 
was properly proscribed by the Code and the statute prohibiting 
solicitation.98 
The essence of the appellate division rationale was the determi­
nation, after detailed review of Bates, Primus, and Ohralik, that the 
letters constituted solicitation and, thus, could be proscribed.99 The 
court found the proscription proper because there was an alternative 
channel, newspaper advertising, that did not present the dangers as­
sociated with direct mail: Loss of anonymity; invasion of privacy; 
and undue infiuence. 1OO 
The court considered the attorneys' reliance on Bates and, al­
though such reliance was mistaken, determined it to have been in 
95. 70 A.D.2d at 256, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 563. The pleadings of the two parties illus­
trate a basic problem concerning the use of direct mail communication. The result of a 
challenge to proscription of the use of direct mail communication can tum on semantics, 
the advertising-solicitation dichotomy. See notes 12-13 supra for a discussion of the di­
chotomy and its fallacy. Ifdirect mail is considered advertising and complies with Bates, 
it is readily permissible in the absence of an explicit statutory prohibition to the contrary. 
In a case of statutory proscription, a viable argument exists based on the constitutional 
grounds of first amendment protection for commercial speech. See notes 38-70 supra 
and accompanying text. If, on the other hand, the direct mail communication is con­
strued as solicitation, the arguments will involve the question of attorney motive for pe­
cuniary gain and the various evils associated with solicitation. See notes 97-109 infra 
and accompanying text. 
96. 70 A.D.2d at 256, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 563. 
97. Id at 256-57, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 563. 
98. Id at 254, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 562. 
99. Id at 272, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573. The court found Bales inapplicable because 
the Supreme Court there did not answer the question of whether direct mail solicitation 
of prospective clients constitutes advertising. Id at 262, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 567. The court 
found Primus "not pointedly relevant to this case, since here it is clear that the respon­
dents' mail solicitation offering legal services was solely for their pecuniary benefit." Id 
at 266, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 569. The court classified the direct mail effort as solicitation and, 
relying on Onralik, indicated that it was properly prohibited as an invasion of privacy 
and a violation-of the "high standards [of] ... licensed professionals." Id at 274, 420 
N.Y.S.2d at 575. 
100. Id at 272 n.4, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 573 n.4. 
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good faith; and neither attorney was disbarred, suspended, or cen­
sured. 101 Attorneys Kofller and Harrison then appealed as a matter 
of right on the· constitutional grounds of improper proscription of 
commercial speech. 102 
B. Reasoning of the Court ofAppeals 
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals first defined the 
issue in the case as the constitutionalilty of a proscription of direct 
mail communication with potential clients concerning legal fees and 
services, and limited appellants to contesting DR 2-103(A) and the 
statute as applied to their activities. lo3 The court derived the limita­
tion by classifying the direct mail communication as commercial 
speech to which overbreadth analysis is inapplicable. I04 The court 
refused to rule on whether solicitation of clients through materials 
addressed to real estate brokers seeking referrals of closings could be 
proscribed.105 The reasons for this refusal were threefold: The read­
ily distinguishable nature of third party direct mail communication 
from direct mail communication to prospective clients; 106 the ab­
sence of a complete factual record on the broker letters; and the in­
complete consideration of the third party issue by the lower court. 107 
Having restricted the issue, the court proceeded to the problem of 
semantic classification of direct mail communication as advertising 
or solicitation. lOS 
101. Id at 274, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 575. 
102. 51 N.Y.2d at 143,412 N.E.2d at 929, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 873. 
103. Id at 144, 412 N.E.2d at 930, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 874. 
104. Id at 144-45,412 N.E.2d at 930-31, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 874-76. Overbreadth 
analysis, used in cases involving restraints on speech, is defined as a showing that the 
challenged rule served to suppress speech, without requiring the individual challenging 
the restriction to demonstrate that his specific conduct was prohibited. A showing of 
general suppression of speech is sufficient to establish a first amendment violation. Bates 
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 379-380 (1977). Overbreadth is based on the premise that an 
overly broad statute might serve to chill protected speech. Id at 380. This analytical 
approach is inapplicable to commercial speech because overly broad regulation is un­
likely to inhibit such speech, with its link to commercial well-being and pecuniary inter­
est. Id at 380-81. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 710-12, 714 n.3; Note, The 
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970). 
105. 51 N.Y.2d at 144-45, 412 N.E.2d at 930, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 874. 
106. Id at 144-45 n.2, 412 N.E.2d at 930 n.2, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 874 n.2. Third party 
mailings will almost always involve in-person solicitation by the intermediary and there­
fore are closer to the Ohralik rule. Id 
107. Id at 144-45, 412 N.E.2d at 930, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 874. For the lower court's 
response to this refusal in KoftIer, see In re Greene, 78 A.D.2d 131, 132,433 N.Y.S.2d 
853, 854 (1980) (per curiam) (direct mail to real estate brokers is a violation of the 
antisolicitation statute). 
108. 51 N.Y.2d at 145-46,412 N.E.2d at 930-31, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875. 
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The court disagreed with the appellate division's conclusion that 
solicitation subject to proscription can be differentiated from consti­
tutionally protected commercial speech by mere categorization. 109 
The court relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Bigelow to 
conclude that the starting point to determine the constitutionality of 
proscriptive regulations is a basic balancing test. Regardless of the 
label employed~ommercial speech, commercial advertising, or so­
licitation-the judiciary must assess the first amendment interest at 
stake and weigh it against the public interest served by the regula­
tion. llo The court described the parameters of the question and re­
solved the semantic dilemmalll by adopting a commercial speech 
analysis. I 12 
The court supported its choice of a commercial speech analysis 
by first noting the semantic differences between advertising and so­
licitation. ll3 Semantic analysis, however, is nondispositive when the 
activity to be regulated evidences a dual nature: All advertising, di­
rectly or indirectly, involves solicitation. 114 Proscription of the let­
ters, the content of which did not violate DR 2-1O}1ls of the Code 
because the letters, as direct mail communication, could also be con­
strued as solicitation, generates three problems. First, the proscrip­
tion ignores the strong societal and individual interests in advertising 
as a means of information dissemination and facilitation of informed 
choices by consumers. Second, the proscription produces confusion 
within the legal profession because there is no clear standard for 
judging the acceptability of advertising. Finally, the proscription 
suggests that there is something improper about an attorney's desire 
to earn a fee. 116 The court's recognition that attorney direct mail 
communication related solely to the economic interest of the attor­
neys and the recipients eliminates the problems of a semantic analy­
sis and is the first step in a commercial speech analysis. ll7 
A commercial speech analysis involves examination of the con­
tent and manner of a particular expression to determine whether a 
109. Id. at 146,412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875. 
110. Id. 
111. See notes 12-13 supra for a complete description of this dilemma. 
112. 51 N.Y.2d at 146-47,412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76. See notes 
113-31 infra and accompanying text for court's commercial speech analysis. 
113. 51 N.Y.2d at 146,412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76. 
114. See notes 12-13 supra. 

ll5. 51 N.Y.2d at 146,412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76. 

116. 51 N.Y.2d at 146-47,412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76. 
117. Id. at 147,412 N.E.2d at 932, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 876. See notes 136-40, 196-202 
infra and accompanying text for analysis of this first step. 
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particular restriction violates the Constitution. 118 The court relied 
on the four-part test presented by the Supreme Court in Central Hud­
son to examine the content of the attorney letters: (1) Whether the 
material was misleading or related to unlawful activity; (2) whether 
the governmental interests that the regulation sought to protect were 
substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advanced those gov­
ernment interests; and (4) whether there was a less restrictive alterna­
tive than the present regulation. I 19 The court found that the content 
of the letters was not misleading or related to unlawful activity.120 
There was a substantial government interest at stake, and advance­
ment of that interest was directly related to the regulation. That 
interest is to prevent deception, invasion of privacy, over­
commercialization of the legal profession, and conflicts of interest. 121 
Finally, a less restrictive alternative was available: A filing require­
ment, similar to the present fee statement filing requirement, easily 
could be applied to direct mail copy. 122 The court then proceeded to 
an examination of the manner of communication in which the mate­
rial was disseminated: direct mail. I23 
The court's proposed test for the examination of the constitu­
tionality of a manner restriction was drawn from the Supreme Court 
in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission 124 and Vir­
ginia Pharmacy. 125 The test contained three elements: (1) Whether 
the restriction was reasonable; (2) whether the restriction served a 
118. Id at 150,412 N.E.2d at 933-34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. See Friedman v. Rog· 
ers, 440 U.S. I, 9-10 (1979); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); Virginia State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761, 770-71 
(1976). 
119. 51 N.Y.2d at 147,412 N.E.2d at 932, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 876. 
120. Id at 148, 412 N.E.2d at 932, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 876. The committee did not 
allege in its complaint that the attorney's letter was either misleading or related to unlaw­
ful activity. 
121. Id at 148-49,412 N.E.2d at 932-33, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 877. The direct relation 
between the regulation and the advancement of a government interest was deemed to be 
minimal because the prevention of deception was the only directly related government 
interest of the interests noted. Id. Invasion of privacy, overcommercialization, and con­
flicts of interest were distinguished as inapplicable to direct mail communication. The 
recipient of a lawyer's letter may escape the letter's influence merely by transferring it 
from the envelope to the wastebasket. Id. 
122. Id at 150, 412 N.E.2d at 933, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. The Stuart court sug­
gested the filing of direct mail copy with the bar association. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. 
Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978). 
123. 51 N.Y.2d at 150,412 N.E.2d at 933-34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. 
124. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
125. The Consolidated Edison Court merely reiterated the test proposed in Virginia 
Pharmacy. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 535. These two cases are indistinguishable 
on their facts from KoJIler when considered in the broad context of commercial speech. 
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significant government interest; and (3) whether the restriction al­
lowed ample alternative channels of communication. 126 The court 
found that an absolute proscription was unreasonable in light of a 
less restrictive alternative: filing a copy of the letter with the state 
bar association. 127 The court's previous content analysis of govern­
ment interest served to demonstrate the existence and significance of 
the government interest advanced by the regulation for purposes of 
the manner analysis. 128 That there was no information available to 
the court presenting comparative costs and effectiveness of suggested 
alternatives led to the determination that there was no basis to con­
clude that ample alternative channels of communication existed in 
addition to direct mail communication. 129 The court concluded that, 
under either a content or a manner analysis, absolute proscription of 
attorney direct mail communication is not constitutionally viable be­
cause absolute proscription violates the attorney's first amendment 
rights in commercial speech. 130 
The court of appeals, therefore, held that direct mail solicitation 
of potential clients by attorneys is constitutionally protected com­
mercial speech that may be regulated but not proscribed. 131 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The discussion in this section will cover three major areas: Dis­
tillation of the KojfIer court's rationale into an analytical approach 
to be utilized in cases wherein the Bates line is nondispositive; com­
parison of the KojfIer rationale with the other three state court 
cases132 that dealt specifically with attorney direct mail solicitation of 
prospective clients; and criticisms of KojfIer. 
A. The Koffler Approach 
There are three inquiries in the KojfIer approach: (1) Whether 
126. 51 N.Y.2d at 150,412 N.E.2d at 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. 
127. Id. at 150,412 N.E.2d at 933, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. The court analogized this 
direct mail copy filing requirement to the New York requirement of filing retainer fee 
statements with the court. Id. See note 122 supra and accompanying text. The New 
York court rule does not provide for any review of the statements once they are filed. 22 
NYCRR 691.20 (1979). There is, however, an implicit assumption that filing, in and of 
itself, is sufficient to control any unsavory practices in the area of fees and retainers. 
128. See note 121 supra and accompanying text. 
129. 51 N.Y.2d at 150,412 N.E.2d at 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 143,412 N.E.2d at 929, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 873. 
132. See note 21 supra. 
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the communication is commercial speech; 133 (2) whether a proscrip­
tion of the content is constitutional;l34 and (3) whether the proscrip­
tion of the manner of dissemination is constitutional. l35 
The first inquiry involves the use of the Central Hudson defini­
tion of commercial speech: "[ e ]xpression related solely to the eco­
nomic interest of the speaker and its audience."l36 This definition 
encompasses not only the advertising and solicitation dealt with in 
Bates and Ohra/ik but also any commercially motivated communi­
cation not included in Primus .137 The importance of this first deter­
mination is that it avoids the semantic problem inherent in the 
classification of a communication as being either solicitation or ad­
vertising. l38 Furthermore, the determination of commercial or non­
commercial speech establishes the standard of constitutional review 
to be used in the case.l39 Application of the Central Hudson defini­
tion as the threshold step of the Ko.ffIer approach will result in the 
utilization of Primus as dispositive case law for those communica­
tions that are not economically motivated and thus not commercial 
speech. 140 Economically motivated communications will be termed 
commercial speech and are subject to application of the remaining 
two inquiries of the approach. 
The second Ko.ffIer inquiry again resorts to Central Hudson to 
determine whether a given regulation may constitutionally proscribe 
the content of a communication given a commercial speech status. 
The Central Hudson content analysis involves four separate subin­
quiries. First, the expression must concern a lawful activity and 
must not be misleading. 141 Second, the government interest asserted 
must be substantial. Third, if both these inquiries yield positive an­
swers, the court must determine whether the regulation directly ad­
vances the government interest asserted and, fourth, whether there is 
133. See 51 N.Y.2d at 144-47,412 N.E.2d at 931,432 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76. 
134. Id at 147,412 N.E.2d at 932, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 876. 
135. Id at 147, 412 N.E.2d at 933-34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 876. 
136. 447 U.S. at 561. 
137. Primus dealt with communication that was not motivated primarily by the 
speaker's pecuniary interest. See 436 U.S. at 416. The Koffler court characterized 
Primus as dealing with attorney-prospective client communication at the political and 
associationallevel. 51 N.Y.2d at 147,412 N.E.2d at 931-32, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 876. 
138. See notes 12, 109-17 supra and accompanying text. 
139. See notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text. 
140. See 436 U.S. at 431-33 for a discussion of the Primus test and its application. 
141. Bales stated that communication concerning obviously illegal transactions 
may be suppressed. 433 U.S. at 384. Pittsburgh Press indicated an absence of first 
amendment interest when the commercial activity about which the information to be 
communicated is itself illegal. 425 U.S. at 388-89. 
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a less restrictive alternative to the regulation. 142 If the communica­
tion is misleading or relates to unlawful activity, or the regulation 
directly advances a substantial government interest in the absence of 
a less restrictive alternative, the regulation is constitutional as ap­
plied to proscribe the content of the communication. In other cases, 
the regulation is an unconstitutional proscription of content. 143 In 
either instance, a complete constitutional analysis of a regulation 
must include not only an examination of the proscription of content 
but also an examination of the regulation as a proscription on the 
manner of communication. 144 
The final inquiry of the KoJIler approach is a manner analysis 
that uses the approach proposed by the Court in Virginia Pharmacy 
to determine the constitutionality of regulations proscribing the 
manner of dissemination of commercial speech. 145 The Virginia 
Pharmacy analysis involves three subparts: Whether the restriction 
is reasonable; whether the restriction serves a significant government 
interest; and whether the restriction leaves open ample, alternative 
channels of communication. 146 If all three KoJIler inquiries and their 
subparts are answered affirmatively, the regulation is a constitutional 
proscription of the manner of dissemination of commercial speech. 
KoJIler's three-step analytical approach provides definitive 
guidelines to assist the courts in ruling on the constitutionality of 
142. 51 N.Y.2d at 147, 412 N.E.2d at 932, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 876. The Supreme 
Court, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), used the Central 
Hudson approach and indicated the third factor presents the most difficult analytical task 
in the use of the approach. Id at 508-09. Analysis of the third factor involves resolution 
of the conflicting interests of the government and those persons seeking to purvey goods 
and services through commercial speech. I d at 512. 
143. Other cases arise when the commercial activity about which the information 
is to be communicated is not misleading, deceptive, or illegal; when the government in­
terest to be advanced by the regulation is insubstantial; or when there is a less restrictive 
alternative to the regulation. The KojJler court found a substantial state interest directly 
related to the proscription of attorney direct mail communication, 51 N. Y.2d at 149-50, 
412 N.E.2d at 933, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878, yet found the proscription unconstitutional on 
the grounds that less restrictive alternatives existed to further the interest. Id at 150-51, 
412 N.E.2d at 933, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. 
144. Id at 150-51, 412 N.E.2d at 933-34, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. Initially, it might 
appear that if a communication were constitutionally proscribed with regard to content, a 
manner examination would be unnecessary. A manner examination, however, is neces­
sary in the interest of crisp and concise judicial analysis. If parties have received a deci­
sion on both content and manner, they have guidance that will enable them to revise 
either the communication and its dissemination or the state regulation in order to comply 
with the appropriate regulatory and constitutional standards without engaging in further 
litigation. 
145. Id at 150, 412 N.E.2d at 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. 
146. Id 
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regulations proscribing attorney communication with prospective 
clients. The significance of KofJIer's approach becomes apparent 
when the formula is compared with those rationales and approaches 
used by other state supreme courts in attorney direct mail communi­
cation cases. 
B. Comparative Analysis of the Kofller Approach 
Only three other state supreme courts have ruled in the area of 
attorney direct mail communication. This section will analyze the 
rationale in each of those cases and will compare each rationale with 
the KofJIer approach. 
In Eaton v. Supreme Court ofArkansas,147 two attorneys, who 
were partners in private practice, contracted with an advertising con­
cern to distribute an advertisement for their law firm in a discount 
coupon packet mailed to 10,000 homes in North Little Rock, Arkan­
sas. A complaint seeking disciplinary action followed in which the 
attorneys were charged with violation of DR 2-101(A) and DR 2­
103(A) of the Arkansas Code of Professional Responsibility}48 The 
Eaton court used a general three-pronged test to examine and up­
hold the constitutionality of this proscription on attorney direct mail 
communication. 149 
The court first classified the communication as solicitation be­
cause the purpose of the communication was to urge a specific group 
of consumers to seek the attorneys' services. The court stated that 
the purpose of the communication did not include provision of infor­
mation to the consumer and facilitation of informed choice by al­
lowing fee comparison. 150 The court then examined the content of 
the communication and found that its "broad sweep, without any 
indication of charges"151 was insufficient to assist those in need of 
legal services in making an informed choice. 152 The court concluded 
that it was appropriate to restrict content so devoid of consumer in­
formation. 153 Finally, the court examined the manner of dissemina­
tion and found it deceptive, in that the inclusion of the 
communication in a packet with discount coupons could give the 
147. 270 Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 44 (1980), cerl. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981). 
148. Id. at 576, 607 S.W.2d at 56. 
149. Id. at 580-81, 607 S.W.2d at 59-60. 
150. Id. at 580, 607 S.W.2d at 59. The advertisement did not list any fees. Id. at 
581, 607 S.W.2d at 59-60. 
151. Id. at 580, 607 S.W.2d at 59. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 581-82, 607 S.W.2d at 60. 
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false impression of discounted legal services. 154 This indicated that 
the manner of dissemination therefore was impermissible. 155 While 
the result arguably is proper in light of the facts of the case,156 the 
rationale is hardly a model for other courts. The discussion of the 
communication's content and the ~anner of dissemination indicates 
valid reasons that support the restriction. These reasons, deceptive 
manner of dissemination157 and content devoid of valuable and nec­
essary consumer information, 158 however, are very general in nature. 
They do not provide an approach, nor are they capable of distillation 
into an approach that would facilitate determination of the content 
and manner restrictions' constitutionality. The use of the solicita­
tion-advertising dichotomy, furthermore, makes possible the indis­
criminate placement of any activity into the category of solicitation. 
As the Koffler court noted: "[A]U advertising either implicitly or 
explicitly involves solicitation." 159 In contrast to Eaton, Koffler pro­
vides an all encompassing threshold classification of the communica­
tion in question 160 and distinct constitutional tests of content and 
manner restrictions that together provide guidance for subsequent 
decisions. 
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Stuart,161 two attorneys were 
charged with unprofessional and unethical conduct because they 
mailed letters, quoting closing fees, on law office stationary to real 
estate brokers. 162 The Stuart court, in a per curiam opinion, used a 
balancing test without distinction between content and manner, to 
strike down proscription of direct mail communication. This balanc­
ing test proposed that the government interest in prohibition must 
outweigh the individual and societal interest in commercial speech 
for the proscriptive regulation to be valid. 163 This rationale is decep­
tively simple and imprecise. The proposal of a balancing test and 
the implication of commercial speech analysis represent the roots of 
a logical decision rationale. This proposal and implication standing 
154. Id. at 580, 607 S.W.2d at 59. 
155. Id. 
156. Not only was the advertisement devoid of fee charges but it also was decep­
tive in that it gave the impression of discount legal fees by its inclusion in the discount 
coupon packet. Id. See notes 151-54 supra and accompanying text. 
157. 270 Ark. at 580,607 S.W.2d at 59. 
158. Id. at 580-81, 607 S.W.2d at 59-60. 
159. 51 N.Y.2d at 146,412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875. 
160. See notes 120-21 supra and accompanying text. 
161. 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978). 
162. Id. at 933. 
163. Id. at 934. 
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alone, however, are incomplete as an analytical approach. A state­
ment of the various factors that can tip the balance also is necessary. 
For example, this rough balancing test is nondispositive when oneis 
presented with a situation wherein a substantial government interest, 
directly advanced by a restriction of attorney communication, can be 
furthered equally by a l~ss restrictive alternative. 164 Furthermore, 
the balancing test is nondispositive in the face of a significant gov­
ernment interest directly advanced by attorney communication re­
striction when there is a sufficient, alternative means of 
communication. 165 The Ko/.f!er approach avoids these problems by 
precisely presenting the dispositive factors in the form of elements to 
be considered in its manner and content restriction tests.166 
In Allison y. Louisiana State Bar Association,167 two attorneys 
sought to enjoin the state bar association from enforcing against 
them certain disciplinary rules that prohibit the direct mail market­
ing of prepaid legal services to various business groups. 168 Commen­
tators have construed the major thrust of Allison to concern the 
marketing of prepaid legal plans. 169 The use of direct mail commu­
nication as a means of information dissemination in Allison, how­
ever, makes that case appropriate for consideration within the 
present discussion. Allison held that the direct mail communication 
constituted solicitation for pecuniary gain and that it might be pro­
scribed because of the state's traditional and important regulation of 
the practice of law.l7° The Allison rationale on direct mail commu­
nication is capable of distillation into a single classification test. 
This classification test is the solicitation-advertising dichot­
omy,171 previously analyzed in the discussion of Eaton 172 and the 
164. An example of such an alternative is the possibility of filing a recorded tele­
phone solicitation copy with the bar association or the court in addition to a ban on 
telephone solicitation. Each of these alternatives directly advances the important and 
legitimate state interest of prevention of deception. See 51 N.Y.2d at 148-49,412 N.E.2d 
at 932-33, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 877. 
165. An example is the existence of a more cost effective method of attorney com­
munication with prospective clients. Assume arguendo that electronic media is such a 
method, in addition to a ban on telephone solicitation. See 51 N.Y.2d at 150,412 N.E.2d 
at 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 878. 
166. See notes 122-27 supra and accompanying text. 
167. 362 So.2d 489 (La. 1978). 
168. Id. at 489. 
169. Id. at 496 (Tate, J., concurring); Politz, Professional Responsibility, 39 LA. L. 
REV. 831, 837 (1978-79); Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-State Bar Association 
May Constitutionally Prohibit Allorneys from Soliciting Clients Jor Projitthrough the Mail, 
53 TuL. L. REV. 962, 962 (1979). 
170. 362 So.2d at 496. 
171. See notes 110-17 supra and accompanying text. 
172. See notes 159-60 supra and accompanying text. 
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KoJIler appellate division opinion. I73 That dichotomy, even in com­
bination with the very general manner and content tests, did not 
make either Eaton 174 or the KoJIler appellate division opinion 175 
models for other courts to follow. The dichotomy is manifestly un­
satisfactory as a rationale that could provide an analytical approach 
for subsequent decisions. Although the forgoing discussion may 
lead the reader to believe that the three-step approach derived from 
KoJIler is the best analytical instrument put forth by the state courts 
for cases not disposed of under the Bates line, the approach is not 
without criticism. 
C. Criticism of Koffler 
KoJIler is subject to two kinds of criticism. First, the analytical 
approach underlying the KoJIler rationale is rather structured and 
not the best choice of several alternative approaches. 176 Second, al­
though KoJIler itself has not been the subject of reported criticism, 
the authority on which the court's rationale is based has received 
sharp criticism. 177 
The analytical approach that KojfIer used, by the court's own 
admission, is "structured" .178 Moreover, there is support in the case 
law for a more fluid balancing approach. 179 The balancing approach 
is based on dicta from Pittsburgh Press which invited a balancing 
approach by implying that even advertising of an ordinary commer­
173. See notes 110-12 supra and accompanying text. 
174. See notes 157-65 supra and accompanying text. 
175. See notes 109, 110-17 supra and accompanying text. 
176. Previous discussion has considered and rejected two of these approaches. See 
notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text (analysis using the Bales trilogy); notes 113-17 
supra and accompanying text (semantic analysis through the "advertising-solicitation di­
chotomy"). A third approach is absolutism. Justice Black generally is regarded as the 
foremost exponent of such a position. He argued that the first amendment command that 
Congress shall make "no law" abridging freedom of speech and association is to be con­
strued literally. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment 
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 935-36 (1968). 
Limited first amendment protection, however, is the standard in the commercial speech 
area. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363-64 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). The absolutist 
approach is therefore inappropriate in the commercial speech context. See notes 186-95 
infra and accompanying text for discussion of the remaining two approaches. 
177. See notes 196-97 infra and accompanying text. 
178. 51 N.Y.2d at 147,412 N.E.2d at 932,432 N.Y.S.2d at 876. See note 184 infra 
and accompanying text for a critique of the "structured" approach. 
179. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); Rowan v. United States Post 
Office Dept., 300 F. Supp. 1036, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (three judge panel) (Hufstedler, J., 
concurring), affd, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
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cial transaction could be accorded constitutional protection when the 
first amendment interest outweighs the government interest support­
ing the regulation. 180 
KojJler's structured, analytical approach, considered in light of 
the court's comment or constitutional commercial speech analysis,181 
essentially is a revival of Professor Nimmer's definitional approach, 
enunciated in 1968. 182 The strength of the definitional approach lies 
in the fact that it generates a rule that may be employed in future 
cases without the need for a weighing of interests. 183 The approach, 
therefore: Defines the scope of the first amendment with regard to a 
particular category of speech; provides a measure of constitutional 
certainty with regard to first amendment application; and minimizes 
the possibility that uncertainty of first amendment protection may 
serve to chill speech. 184 
In addition to the absolutist l85 and definitional approaches, 
there is a third approach that remains viable: pure, ad hoc balanc­
ing. 186 This approach, however, is subject to several criticisms. Jus­
tice Black, a strong advocate for the alternative approach of 
absolutism,187 indicated that the use of ad hoc balancing tests, 
whereby speech is left unprotected under certain circumstances, is a 
180. 413 u.s. at 389. 
181. 51 N.Y.2d at 146,412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875. 
182. Nimmer, supra note 176, at 942. Professor Nimmer describes the definitional 
approach as the appropriate alternative to absolutism, see note 176 supra, and pure ad 
hoc balancing, see note 186 infra. Balancing is used in the definitional approach not for 
the purpose of determining which litigant should prevail in the particular case, but rather· 
to define which forms of communication merit first amendment protection. Nimmer, 
supra note 176, at 942. Professor Nimmer's analysis deals with traditional first amend­
ment interests at a time when Valentine still negated first amendment protection for com­
mercial speech. See notes 39-69 supra and accompanying text. The difference between 
the traditional standard of review, strict scrutiny, and the Central Hudson intermediate 
scrutiny test does affect the discussion here. Use of intermediate scrutiny in commercial 
speech analysis merely means that the state interest need not be virtually absolute in 
order to prevail. 
183. Nimmer, supra note 176, at 944-45. 
184. Id at 945. Professor Tribe indicates that criticism of a structured definitional 
approach centers on the feeling that the approach masks and attempts to escape a weigh­
ing of competing policy and value considerations. L. TRIBE, supra note 20, § 12-2, at 
582-84. This criticism is inappropriate as the structured definitional approach does in­
clude a weighing of those considerations, but only for the purpose of defining the scope 
of first amendment protection. See note 161 supra. 
185. See note 176 supra for description of the absolutist approach. 
186. Pure ad hoc balancing involves a weighing of the government's interest in 
speech regulation against the speaker's interest in communication in each and every case 
without the application of any previously determined judicial rule. Nimmer, supra note 
176, at 939. 
187. See note 176 supra and accompanying text. 
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standing invitation to abridge speech at will. 188 
Professor Nimmer criticizes ad hoc balancing on three grounds. 
First, each case in which the approach is used must involve a weigh­
ing of the specific interests at stake. Therefore, in the absence of a 
prior final adjudication of these same interests by the highest court, a 
speaker has no standard by which to measure the relative weight of 
his interest against that of those seeking to regulate his speech. This 
absence of a definite standard has a manifest chilling effect on 
speech. 189 
The second criticism is that ad hoc balancing generally results 
in a favoring of the restriction of speech. 190 The rationale for this 
criticism is twofold. Free speech issues generally are not raised un­
less there is a violation of a law that results in prosecution by the 
authorities. 191 As those who run afoul of repressive laws and suffer 
prosecution are those who express the most unpopular ideas, it is too 
much to expect that the judiciary will remain untouched by such 
strong popular feelings. The mere possibility of an unconscious bias 
is sufficient to adversely affect reliable operation of the balance. 192 
A final criticism of ad hoc balancing is that ingrained judicial 
deference to the legislature also may adversely affect the operation of 
the balance when the constitutionality of a legislative enactment is at 
issue. The result in such a situation is judicial abdication in the 
weighing process. 193 
Proponents of ad hoc balancing advance it, despite its flaws, as a 
sensible alternative to absolutism. 194 In the area of commercial 
speech, however, absolutism is inapplicable by definition.195 The 
flaws and criticisms noted above, in the absence of a pressing neces­
sity for an alternative to absolutism, are fatal when, in a commercial 
speech context, ad hoc balancing is compared with the definitional 
approach. 
The other kind of criticism of KojJIer is KojJIer's choice of case 
authority in support of its proposed three-step analytical approach. 
The choice arguably is an endorsement of that authority. Criticism 
188. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
189. Nimmer, supra note 176, at 939. 
190. Id at 939-40. 
191. Id at 940. 
192. Id 
193. Id at 940-41. 
194. Id at 939. 
195. See note 176 supra. 
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of the authority, therefore, is tacit criticism ofKojfler's choice of that 
authority. 
The first step of the Kojfler analytical approach involves the use 
of the Central Hudson definition of commercial speech: 
"[e]xpression related solely to the economic interest of the speaker 
and its audience." 196 This definition is only one of two in the Central 
Hudson opinion. 197 The other definition described commercial 
speech as "speech proposing a commercial transaction."198 Justice 
Stevens, in his concurring opinion to Central Hudson, cited the two 
definitions and indicated dissatisfaction with them both: The first 
was clearly too broad and the second, although somewhat narrower 
in scope, was still overly encompassing. 199 Justice Stevens' criticism 
of the first definition is inappropriate with regard to its application in 
Kojfler. The crux of the first step of the Kojfler approach is the selec­
tion of a definition that is sufficiently broad to include all transac­
tions which are not governed directly by the Bates line. The end 
result of utilizing a very broad definition of commercial speech is 
that Kojfler and the Bates line will combine to provide complete, 
initial coverage of all transactions, thus avoiding the semantic 
problems of the advertising-solicitation dichotomy.2oo The first Cen­
tral Hudson definition is broad enough to accomplish this task of 
spanning the gaps in the Bates line.201 To foresake the use of this 
first, broad Central Hudson definition for the second definition 
would make the Kojfler analytical approach properly subject to Jus­
tice Stewart's criticism of restrictiveness associated with the second 
definition. The second definition pertains to communications that 
are akin to offers.202 Communications seeking to generate legal busi­
ness but not rising to the level of an offer are not covered by the 
second definition. This failure of the second definition to be all in­
clusive would give rise to the same semantic dilemma previously 
196. See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text. 
197. 447 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
198. Id at 580. The context in which the Court expressed the second definition, id 
at 562, was a citation to Ohralik and Bales. Arguably, in light of that context, the second 
definition is not intended as operative, but rather as descriptive of the Ohralik and Bales 
views on commercial speech. 
199. 447 U.S. at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
200. See notes 12-13 supra. 
201. Briefly, Primus disposed of an attorney's solicitation absent a motive of pecu­
niary gain. Ohralik disposed of in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain that has the 
possibility of fraud, overreaching, and undue influence. Bales covered attorney advertis- . 
ing. See note 18 supra. 
202. 447 U.S. at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
425 1982) DIRECT MAIL COMMUNICATION 
mentioned.203 
The four-step Central Hudson content analysis, used as the sec­
ond part of the Ko.ffler analytical approach,204 received criticism in 
Justice Blackmun's Central Hudson concurrence.20S Justice Black­
mun stated that four-part content analysis was not representative of 
the prior Supreme Court opinions on commercial speech.206 He 
noted that the governing principle of those decisions was that the 
"[s]tate may 'not [pursue its goals] by keeping the public in igno­
rance.' "207 Essentially, he felt that the content analysis swept too 
broadly and solved the Central Hudson problem of manipulating the 
public's electrical consumption practices,208 through suppression of 
information, rather than through a direct attack on the problem it­
selp09 That criticism is inapplicable in the Kofller context because 
Ko.ffler sought to deal directly with the conduct of a group of profes­
sionals as the group attempted to establish client relationships with 
the public. Moreover, a second response to Justices Stevens' and 
Brennan's criticism of Central Hudson is found when one observes 
that the five opinions to date citing Central Hudson do so 
favorably.210 
The final part of the Ko.ffler approach, manner analysis, is 
drawn from the Virginia Pharmacy and Consolidated Edison manner 
tests.2lI Neither case has been criticized on its proposed manner 
analysis. 
v. CONCLUSION 
There are four Supreme Court decisions in the area of attorney 
203. See notes 113-17 supra and accompanying text. 
204. See notes 141-44 supra and accompanying text. 
205. 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 576 (quoting Virginia State Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Con­
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976». 
208. Justice Blackmun cited as an example the excessive use of air conditioning 
and its resulting drain of electrical power. He felt that the Central Hudson content analy­
sis would allow an absolute ban on advertising of air conditioning in order to create the 
most effective deterrence to overuse of electricity. Id. at 575. 
209. Id. 
210. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981); John Don­
nelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6, 8, 21 (1st Cir. 1980), affd, 453 U.S. 916 (1981); 
Record Revolution No.6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 936 (6th Cir. 1980), va­
cated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1031 (1981); AD World, Inc. v. Township of Doyles­
town, 510 F. Supp. 851, 854 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 672 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 
1981); Weiler v. Carpenter, 507 F. Supp. 837, 844 (D. N.M. 1981); In re W. T. Grant Co., 
6 Bankr. 762, 767-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
211. See notes 145-46 supra and accompanying text. 
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solicitation and advertising. Bates v. State Bar ofArizona212 mani­
fested the Court's explicit yet narrow approval of attorney advertis­
ing as commercial speech. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n 213 
demonstrated the Court's aversion to in-person solicitation for pecu­
niary gain that is fraught with the dangers of deception, overreach­
ing, undue influence, and commercialization. In re Primus214 was 
the culmination of the Button line: Collective activity, inclusive of 
solicitation, undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts, is 
a fundamental right protected by the first amendment. Primus also 
represented the Court's concern with individual attorney solicitation 
undertaken as an expression of first amendment political and associ­
ational rights. In re R.M.J. 215 both examined the specific question of 
whether the amended Missouri advertising rules conformed to Bates 
and provided some generalizations on commercial speech doctrine in 
the context of professional services advertising. None of these cases 
provided a concise, analytical approach to situations that arguably 
are both solicitation and advertising. The most striking example of 
such a situation is attorney direct mail communication with prospec­
tive clients. 
In re Ko.f!!er216 enunciated such an approach in three steps: 
Classification as commercial speech under Central Hudson; the Cen­
tral Hudson test to determine the constitutionality of restriction of 
content, and the Virginia Pharmacy test to determine the constitu­
tionality of a restriction on manner of dissemination. This approach 
is one of four rationales advanced by state supreme courts deciding 
cases in this area. 
In comparison with the other three state supreme court deci­
sions, the Ko.f!!er analytical approach provides definitive guidance 
for judicial analysis in subsequent decisions. Ko.f!!er, in using the 
threshold commercial speech determination, neatly avoided the 
problem ofthe solicitation-advertising dichotomy that tainted the ra­
tionale in both Eaton and Allison . Furthermore, Ko.f!!er's use of spe­
cific elements as a measure of the balance between substantial, 
significant, and important state interests served by the regulation and 
first amendment rights inherent in commercial speech, eliminates the 
problems of vagueness and the dearth of dispositive factors which 
plague the Eaton and Stuart rationales. 
212. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
213. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
214. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
215. 102 S.Ct. 929 (1982). 
216. 51 N.Y.2d 140,412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980). 
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KoJtIer, however, is not without criticism. An alternative to the 
KoJtIer structured formula is the more fluid, ad hoc balancing ap­
proach. Yet, this ad hoc balancing approach is the subject of four 
major criticisms. Review of these criticisms results in the conclusion 
that the ad hoc balancing approach is unsuitable for use in the com­
mercial speech area. 
Central Hudson, the basis for the KofIler formula, received criti­
cism from the concurring Central Hudson Supreme Court Justices. 
The Supreme Court criticisms are inapplicable to KoJtIer. The con­
clusion, in light of this discussion, is that the criticisms are insuffi­
cient to negate the proposed use of the KofIler analytical approach. 
Thus, in blending the prior decisions of the Supreme Court into 
its approach, the KoJtIer court has filled the analytical void left by 
the Supreme Court's failure to rule specifically on situations that ar­
guably are both solicitation and advertising. In future cases involv­
ing such dichotomous situations as attorney direct mail 
communication with prospective clients, the courts should utilize the 
three-step, KoJtIer analytical approach to analyze the constitutional­
ity of proscriptive regulations. 
Joseph H. Reinhardt 
